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This paper compares Brazil’s and India’s strategy to obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and the 
implications this has for both countries’ identities. On the one hand, Brazil and India align with developing nations and 
jointly press for more inclusive global governance. On the other hand, critics have pointed out that Brazil’s attempt to 
enter the UN Security Council as a permanent member is not entirely about democratizing the UN, but rather about 
creating an “expanded oligarchy”. This article seeks to better understand the nature of this dilemma, comparing how 
both countries deal with this transition. 
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Este artigo compara a estrategia brasileira com a estrategia indiana para se tornarem membro permanente no Conselho 
de Segurança. Este projeto tem implicações profundas para a identidade e a posição dos dois países no cenário 
internacional. Por um lado, o Brasil e a Índia mantém sua aliança com os países em desenvolvimento, e juntamente 
pressionam os países estabelecidos para reformar as instituições internacionais. Por outro lado, a tentativa brasileira 
e indiana de tornarem-se membro permanente não é apenas um projeto de democratização da governança global, mas 
também fruto da própria ambição de fazer parte de uma “oligarchia expandida”, que pode causar críticas no mundo 
em desenvolvimento. O artigo procura entender melhor a natureza deste dilema, comparando como os dois países 
lidam com esta transição.
Palavras-chave: Conselho de Segurança das Nações Unidas, Brasil, Índia
Permanent UN Security Council membership – or the lack thereof – is a de! ning factor of a nation’s geopolitical status and position. Furthermore, it fundamentally a# ects the country’s outlook 
and overall understanding of the global political system. 
Despite occasional contradictory rhetoric, all permanent 
UN Security Council members, including China, regard 
the international order as fundamentally sound and can 
thus be described as “status quo powers”. In addition, the 
“P5” have been largely responsible for the fact that all 
attempts to enlarge the number of permanent members 
have proved illusive. 
Conversely, emerging powers who are not permanent 
members of the most prestigious institution of the world, 
such as Brazil and India, have built their foreign policy 
identity around the fact that they are excluded. * eir 
“membership” of the disenfranchised has, more than 
anything, shaped both their rhetoric and their worldview 
of a system that is fundamentally unjust.
At the same time, Brazil and India are the most active 
advocates for UN Security Council expansion. * is creates 
a dilemma for both actors. Allied to, and many times the 
leaders of, developing countries without any perspective to 
be included into a powerful international institution such 
as the UN Security Council, both Brazil and India profess 
to defend the disenfranchised. * eir e# ort to become 
permanent members, however, is likely to turn them into 
status quo powers, and it is unclear in how far they would 
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continue to support the voice of the poor once they form 
part of the ruling oligarchic class. In fact, several poor 
countries in all regions of the world have actively sought 
to prevent Brazil and India from entering the UNSC as 
permanent members, and African countries –arguably 
the most disadvantaged and the least integrated into 
international structures – have been the most obstinate 
with regard to expansion. 
* is paper thus seeks to explore the ways Brazil and 
India attempt to align their objective of a more equitable 
world order with a greater say for the poor with their own 
ambitions to become a global actor established in today’s 
international structures. * is struggle symbolizes the 
transition both countries are undergoing internally, li+ ing 
millions out of poverty, becoming more competitive, 
and with interests slowly moving away from those of 
other developing countries, aligning with those of richer 
countries. While their rhetoric o+ en indicates that they 
remain aligned with the developing world, there is 
increasing evidence that their interests are beginning to 
diverge from those of the G77. For example, both Brazil 
and India have turned into lenders of the IMF and the 
World Bank. 
* is paper is divided into three parts. First, it gives 
a brief overview over the history of the UN Security 
Council to put the discussion into context. Secondly, it 
seeks to analyze both Brazil’s and India’s stance towards 
UNSC reform and the dilemma Brazil and India ! nd 
themselves in. What have both countries done to obtain 
permanent membership, and how do they deal with the 
tensions this causes in their e# orts to defend the poor? 
Or is their strategy of styling themselves as the defenders 
of the dispossessed deliberate and part of their tactic to 
permanently enter the UNSC as representatives of the 
poor? Finally, the question is analyzed whether Brazil 
and India can continue to act as * ird World leaders a+ er 
they have turned into permanent UNSC members and 
into established status quo powers. How will they change 
their rhetoric to maintain their credibility among the poor, 
a group of countries over which they wield an enormous 
in" uence, as their leadership during trade negotiations 
over the past years shows? 
1. The UN Security Council
As argu ably the most important international institution 
of all, the UN Security Council (herea+ er UNSC) remains 
the symbol of global governance and the only judge for 
de! ning what amounts to a threat to international peace.1 
Despite its importance, remarkably little has been written 
about the Council, as Edward Luck points out.2
* e Security Council built on the experiences 
of the League of Nations. In order to strengthen the 
new institution’s ability, the Council’s creators made 
three fundamental changes. First, they gave the organ 
enforcement capabilities. Second, they discarded the 
unanimity role, which was seen as one of the major reasons 
for the League’s failure3, and gave veto power to a small 
number of powerful states.4 Its enforcement authority 
is unique in the history of international institutions.5 
To compensate the smaller nations, the UN General 
Assembly (herea+ er UNGA) was given the 
right to discuss security matters under article 
10 and give recommendations to the UNSC. 
* e voting procedures in the UNSC were 
agreed upon during the Yalta Conference by 
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill in February 
1945, and adopted in June of the same year at 
the UN conference in San Francisco.6
* e Security Council held its ! rst session in 1946 in 
London. Since then, the Council has existed in continuous 
session in New York City. * e Council consists of 15 
members: 5 veto-wielding permanent members (China, 
France, Russia, United Kingdom, and United States, called 
the “P 5”7) and 10 elected non-permanent members with 
two-year terms. In order to respond quickly to crisis 
situations, representatives of the countries occupying the 
Council must always be present. Few rules have changed 
since the Council’s inception in 1945. Articles 23 and 27 
of the UN Charter were amended in 1965, increasing the 
Council’s membership from eleven to ! + een, increasing 
the necessary votes for the adoption of resolutions from 
seven to nine.8
* e Cold War largely immobilized the UNSC9, but even 
a+ er a brief moment of hope at the Cold War, criticism 
persisted.10 In 1990, the UNSC authorized the use of 
force for the second time in history, and a large coalition 
force under US leadership defeated Iraq.11 In 1992, John 
Major captured the spirit of the time when he argued 
that at last the UNSC was ful! lling the role envisioned 
by the UN’s founders in 1945.12 Since then, however, the 
Council proved to be a largely ine# ective instrument in 
the context of collective security, failing to take action in 
the face of horri! c human su# ering in Rwanda and former 
Yugoslavia, and making serious mistakes with regards 
All permanent UN Security Council members, 
including China, regard the international order as 
fundamentally sound and can thus be described as 
“status quo powers”.
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to the Somalia mission, which ended unsuccessfully in 
1995.13 “* e veto”, John English and Andrew Cooper 
argued in 2009, “plays havoc with the United Nations.”14 
“* e Security Council failed”, John Glennon announced 
in a similar vein in 2003, a+ er US President Bush had 
decided to invade Iraq. He predicted that the UNSC would 
go the same way the League of Nations did sixty-! ve 
years before.15 One of the major criticisms voiced is the 
lack of representativeness.16 A New York Times editorial 
from 2004 re" ected a common opinion when it argued 
that “the Security Council[’s] membership…. re" ects 
the power relations of 1945, not 2004.”17 Reform e# orts 
largely focused on the following categories: the size of an 
enlarged Security Council, the categories of membership, 
the question of regional representation, the question of the 
veto, the working methods of the Security Council and the 
relationship between the Security Council and the General 
Assembly.18
Yet the UNSC proved resilient, adapting to some 
changing realities.19 In 1965, over initial Soviet opposition 
due to continued Taiwanese occupation of the permanent 
seat, the Security Council underwent reform and increased 
the number of members from eleven to ! + een.20 Now, nine 
instead of seven votes were needed to pass a resolution.21 
* is was largely done to re" ect the new realities a+ er the 
wave of decolonization in the 1960s which had caused 
the number of UN members to increase from 51 to 114.22 
In 1971, mainland China was handed the seat until then 
occupied by the government in Taipeh. In 1991, Russia 
was allowed to hold on to the seat until then assigned to 
the Soviet Union.23 Despite frequent criticism, there has 
been no military con" ict between members of the UNSC 
since its inception. Jochen Prantl argues that the Security 
Council is largely functional, and that conclusions of 
failure premature.24 
In other instances, the UNSC has been slow to change.25 
Some years a+ er the expansion in 1965, reform pressure 
resumed due to the growing number of underrepresented 
African countries. E# orts for reform reached another high 
when Razali Ismael, a Malaysian diplomat, submitted to 
the working group a carefully cra+ ed reform proposal in 
1997. Yet too few members were willing to openly support 
the plan to create the necessary political momentum, and 
the plan was not put to vote in the General Assembly.26
In 2002, Ko!  Annan made the rare move for a Secretary 
General to get personally involved in the reform e# orts, 
pursuing the “most ambitious overhaul of the United 
Nations since its inception”.27 * e pressure to reform 
had been particularly high since the 1990s, which can 
paradoxically be explained by the relative successes of 
the Council a+ er the end of the Cold War- as seen by the 
examples of Kuwait28 He presented the report produced 
by the high-level commission he had appointed to make 
proposals about how to deal with “threats, challenges 
and change” confronting the United Nations. While the 
panel speci! cally warned about solely focusing on the 
recommendations on how to reform the UNSC, just this 
happened.29 * e report proposed two reform options 
both of which recommended an expansion from ! + een 
to twenty-four members. One proposal includes Brazil 
and India as permanent members, the other one o# ers 
a rotation principle which would give the two countries 
semi-permanent status.30 
As a response to Annan’s e# orts, reform 
e# orts came relatively close to success in 
2005, when the General Assembly could 
not agree on a reform proposal by the 
G4.31 * is speci! c proposal would have 
included Germany, Brazil, Japan, India 
and two African countries as permanent 
members without veto power. Too many 
key decision makers, however, opposed at least one of the 
G4 members. Particularly the United States only viewed 
Japan’s bid favorably.32 In addition, 43 African countries, 
submitted their own proposal which included veto 
power for two African nations, because non-permanent 
members without a veto have signi! cantly less power 
than veto-wielding members.33 None of the plans received 
enough endorsement to be put to vote in the General 
Assembly. Other, less realistic reform proposals are to 
give the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the power to 
“judicially review” decisions by the UNSC to hold it more 
accountable.34
A+ er the failure in 2005, other proposals surge 
occasionally, but there is overall fatigue with regards to 
reform. In 2006, the “Small 5” (“S-5”) launched a more 
modest reform proposal that merely included procedural 
reforms but no expansion, and Panama later launched a 
“transitional proposal” which foresaw ! ve-year terms 
for non-permanent members with the possibility of 
becoming permanent members without veto power a+ er 
four reelections.35 Yet, despite numerous e# orts within 
the General Assembly’s Working Group on the subject 
(established in 1993), successful reform seems unlikely at 
this point.36 
Despite frequent criticism, there has been no military 
confl ict between members of the UNSC since its 
inception. Jochen Prantl argues that the Security 
Council is largely functional, and that conclusions of 
failure premature.
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2. Brazil and the UN Security Counc il 
Brazil attempted, with the support of the United States, 
to be included as a permanent member of the UNSC 
at its inceptions, but its e# orts were thwarted by the 
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union during the Yalta 
Conference.37 As a consolation prize, Brazil was elected 
as a non-permanent member during the ! rst selection 
process. In addition, Brazil was granted the right 
to speak ! rst at General Assembly meetings. Since 
then, Brazil has been a non-permanent member 
nine times, currently serving for the tenth time.38 
Yehuda Blum argues that Brazil has become 
a de facto “semi-permanent” member of the 
UNSC.39 Brazil is thus, together with Japan, the 
country that has held a non-permanent seat for 
the longest period of time (18 years in total as of 
January 2010). Brazil is also one of the most vocal 
supporters for reform, asking for greater in" uence 
and responsibility for emerging powers such as itself. 
A permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been, 
at varying degrees of intensity, the objective of Brazil’s 
foreign policy over the past decades, but it has intensi! ed 
signi! cantly under Presidents Cardoso (1995-2002) and 
President Lula (2003-2010).40 * ere are two types of reform 
Brazil has sought in the past. First, and most importantly, 
it has argued for membership expansion. Secondly, it has 
at times lobbied for an alteration of the P5’s veto rights. 
President Itamar Franco (1992-1995) articulated this goal 
more clearly than his predecessors. President Cardoso 
(1995-2002) mentioned it more o+ en still, but continued to 
have restraints out of respect for Brazil’s faltering neighbor 
Argentina.41 In addition, Cardoso argued that UNSC 
reform was unlikely, and that Brazil should focus on G8 
reform instead.42 President Lula (2003-2010) was more 
vocal still and made a permanent seat for the UN Security 
Council a key goal of Brazil’s foreign policy strategy.43 
Since its earliest e# orts to join the Council, Brazil has 
argued along similar lines, stressing that its inclusion 
would increase the Council’s legitimacy. As President 
Lula argued in 2008 in the UN General Assembly, “today’s 
structure has been frozen for six decades and does not 
relate to the challenges of today’s world. Its distorted form 
of representation stands between us and the multilateral 
world to which we aspire.”44 Brazil considers the UN 
Security Council as the only organ with a legitimate 
enforcement capacity. * is became obvious in 2002 and 
2003, when both President Cardoso (1995-2002) and 
President Lula (2003-2010) argued that war against Iraq 
would only be justi! able if authorized by the UN Security 
Council.45 
From a more realist point of view, Brazil’s behavior 
can be explained di# erently. Since Brazil lacks signi! cant 
military power, it regards multilateralism as the only way to 
project its power and in" uence outside of its borders. Since 
Brazil lives in an exceptionally peaceful neighborhood, 
it is unlikely that Brazil will ever engage in a military 
build-up. * e United Nations, and a permanent seat on 
the UNSC, are therefore seen, largely out of necessity, as 
one of Brazil’s best bets to turn itself into a global actor.46 
Assessing Brazil’s strategy with regards to UNSC has been 
widely popular among scholars, while few have analyzed 
reform proposals of the UN’s other entities47, and it at 
times seemed as though this particular topic eclipsed all 
other matters related to the United Nations.48
Brazil’s e# orts are also motivated by the belief that 
Brazil deserves a more prominent role as the South 
American representative and the belief that international 
institutions are more legitimate and e# ective if developing 
countries are adequately represented.49 While some 
conservative voices have denounced the quest for UNSC as 
an “unnecessary adventure”, there is now a sold consensus 
that Brazil deserves a permanent seat.50 For Brazil, a 
reformed Security Council re" ects on the legitimacy and 
thus on the e# ectiveness of the entire UN organization, 
and no UN reform is thus complete without a reform of 
the UN Security Council.51
But not all agree with this rationale. Critics argue 
that an expanded UNSC could very well paralyze the 
process.52 Using the same rationale, the G7 long resisted 
reform to maintain e# ectiveness. Finally, there is a more 
fundamental argument against the value of inclusiveness in 
the context of the UNSC. No matter how much the UNSC 
will expand, it will never be as representative as the UN 
General Assembly, which represents all countries. While 
the UN’s creators attempted to make the UNSC as inclusive 
as possible, it was speci! cally not supposed to be inclusive, 
but functional. * e UN General Assembly, on the other 
hand, satis! ed the need for inclusiveness. In this context, it 
seems questionable whether increasing the inclusiveness to 
some degree is a worthwhile exercise if it implies a strong 
reduction of e# ectiveness. Finally, the argument that Brazil 
can represent Latin America in the world’s most important 
international institution is strongly contested outside of 
Reform efforts came relatively close to success in 
2005, when the General Assembly could not agree 
on a reform proposal that would have included 
Brazil, Germany, India and Japan (the “G4”) and 
two African countries as permanent members 
without veto power.
C!"#! I$#%"$!&'($!)      M!"*( +,-, 57
Brazil. In fact, Argentina, Mexico and Colombia all joined 
coalitions (! rst the “Co# ee Club”53, then “Uniting for 
Consensus” a+ er 2005) created to frustrate Brazil’s attempts 
to gain entry as a permanent member.54 In a survey in 
2005, all Latin American countries except Honduras 
and Venezuela said they opposed Brazil’s permanent 
membership.55 * ese smaller countries agree in principal 
that the “global South” needs better representation, but 
there is no consensus about which country should be in 
the Council permanently. Finally, Weiss points out that 
the key problem of the Council is not a lack of legitimacy 
(quite to the contrary, he says), but its strong dependence 
on US military power to enforce its decisions.56
Speci! cally, Brazil seeks to expand the Council with 
several permanent and non-permanent members. * e 
G4’s proposal envisions six new permanent seats (two 
for Africa, two for Asia (India and Japan), one for Latin 
America (Brazil) and the Caribbean and one for Western 
Europe and Others (German); and four new non-
permanent members (one from Africa, one from Asia, one 
from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin America and the 
Caribbean).57 Since expansion and its own inclusion is the 
fundamental objective, Brazil does not favor rotation of 
a new permanent seat to be ! lled by a country from the 
Latin American and Caribbean region.58
While Brazil would certainly prefer to enter the Council 
as a permanent member with veto power, pragmatic 
considerations have led the Brazilian government to seek 
inclusion without veto power.59 * is is widely believed 
to increase the chances for reform. Stressing the need to 
avoid conditions that led to the downfall of the League of 
Nations, the P-5 insisted on having individual veto rights 
over UN Charter amendments.60
In 2004, Brazil joined the G4 in an attempt to realize 
UN Security Council Reform and to obtain a permanent 
seat.61 * e G4 was largely formed to use the “window 
of opportunity” that Ko!  Annan’s push for an intensive 
UN soul searching and reform project had opened.62 
In 2005, the UN Assembly discussed a reform proposal 
which included the addition of the G4 and two African 
nations, as permanent non-veto wielding members.63 * e 
proposal failed to be submitted to a vote in the General 
Assembly, largely because African countries were unable 
to agree who would occupy the two permanent seats.64 
In addition, several countries such as Italy, Argentina, 
Pakistan and Mexico opposed the inclusion of the G4, 
which led Brazilian policy makers to doubt 
whether an alliance with India would be the 
most prominent strategy.65 However, even if 
the Assembly had agreed to the proposal, the 
United States would have most likely vetoed 
it.66 While the G4 has, for now, ceased to exist 
as a vehicle for achieving Security Council 
Reform, Brazil continues to press for expansion 
and a permanent seat.
More recent reform proposals do not 
look promising, but the “Open-ended 
Working Group on the Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security 
Council” (more simply known as the Working Group), set 
up by the General Assembly in 1993, continues to gather 
and discuss possibilities. Brazil still pushes for UNSC 
expansion. * e Brazilian government has continuously 
rejected any more modest proposals that divert attention 
from UNSC expansion.67
 
How has the objective of UN Security Council Reform 
in" uenced President Lula’s foreign policy since 2003? 
Brazil’s strategy towards UNSC reform has been a complex 
mix of multilateral engagement (positioning itself as a 
“responsible stakeholder”), global outreach (diversifying 
its strategic partnerships), assuming regional leadership, 
and becoming the leader of the South (by strengthening 
South-South partnerships and distancing itself from the 
developed world to some degree). While obtaining a seat 
on the UNSC may have been the greatest foreign policy 
goal of the Lula administration, these strategies certainly 
constitute policy goals in themselves as well. During 
interviews for this study, most diplomats named a seat on 
the UNSC, a global trade deal and South American unity 
under Brazilian leadership as the Lula administration’s 
three main foreign policy deals.68
Since 2003, Brazil’s commitment to multilateral 
institutions has continued to be one of its principal policy 
paradigms.69 For example, Brazil has successfully led the 
UN mission in Haiti. Secondly, one of President Lula’s 
major foreign policy innovation a+ er President Cardoso 
(1995-2002) was to diversify Brazil’s strategic partnerships. 
One of the major tools to do so was through trade. * is goal 
was largely achieved, as trade and other ties in Africa and 
Asia have indeed been strengthened. Brazil’s engagement 
Brazil has stressed that its inclusion would increase 
the Council’s legitimacy. However, the argument 
that Brazil can represent Latin America in the 
world’s most important international institution is 
strongly contested. In fact, Argentina, Mexico and 
Colombia all joined coalitions created to frustrate 
Brazil’s attempts to gain entry as a permanent 
member.
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in the Middle East and strengthening ties with Russia 
symbolize this move. In addition, Brazil has attempted to 
turn into a “Leader of the South” by drastically increasing 
aid " ows to poorer countries.70 * irdly, it has been one of 
the major goals of the Brazilian government since 2003 to 
assume regional leadership and help the process of regional 
integration. Results of this third strategy, however, have 
been poor. Progress with regards to Mercosur is largely 
stalled, and UNASUL, a recently created body, is unlikely 
to strengthen integration.
 3. India and the UN Security Council 
India was an avid supporter of the United Nations, 
and the UNSC, since the body’s inception. India, which 
had been a member of the League of Nations71, actively 
campaigned for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council during the San Francisco Conference in 1945, but 
ultimately failed, like Brazil, partly because it was not an 
independent country yet.72 * is can mostly be explained 
by India’s leaders’ refusal to suspend its independence 
struggle, which caused Roosevelt to stop pressuring Great 
Britain to grant independence, driving a wedge between 
the US and India during the War.73 It then changed its 
approach and lobbied towards making population a crucial 
indicator for the selection of the non-permanent members 
to assure its frequent presence on the Council.74 It has been 
on the Council as a non-permanent member six times75, 
making it one of the most frequent non-permanent 
members. As Blum points out, India has obtained, like 
Brazil, “quasi semi-permanent” status, although it has been 
able to participate in the Council as o+ en as Brazil due to its 
regional rivalry with Pakistan.76 In 2010, a+ er Kazakhstan 
decided to give up a campaign it had been waging for years 
to obtain the Asian seat in the UNSC, India will once more 
occupy the non-permanent seat starting in January 2011.77
India has regularly pushed for UNSC Reform, and it 
remains one of the principal foreign policy objectives.78 In 
1979, a series of NAM countries, including India, submitted 
a dra+  resolution to the General Assembly proposing an 
increase of the non-permanent members from 10 to 14. 
* ey argued that UN membership had increased since 
1963, from 136 to 152, and that the last 1965’s bene! ts had 
already been nulli! ed.79 * e 1990s saw India strengthen 
its campaign for reform and a permanent seat on the 
UNSC.80 Finally, in 2005, India was once more, as part of 
the “G4”, one of the driving forces behind a reform e# ort 
which almost led to a second fundamental reform. 
India’s major argument is that its inclusion would 
increase the UNSC’s legitimacy by making it more 
representative of UN membership.81 In 2004, for example, 
India argued that it deserved the seat because it was the 
world’s second largest country in terms of population, 
with a large economy and the third largest contributor 
of troops to UN peace-keeping missions.82 In addition, 
it has always been India’s proclaimed goal to increase the 
representation of the “global South” and limit the in" uence 
of the established powers. * e government argues that an 
“adequate presence” of developing countries is needed in 
the Security Council. Nations of the world must feel that 
their stakes in global peace and prosperity are 
factored into the UN’s decision making. Any 
expansion of permanent members’ category 
must be based on an agreed criteria, rather 
than be a pre-determined selection. * ere must 
be an inclusive approach based on transparent 
consultations. India supports expansion of 
both permanent and non-permanent members’ 
category. * e latter is the only avenue for the 
vast majority of Member States to serve on the Security 
Council. Reform and expansion must be an integral part 
of a common package.”83 With regards to these principled 
motivations, India’s rhetoric has been and remains 
remarkably similar to that of Brazil, another G77 member.
 
But permanent membership would also help India 
defend its ever more global interests. According to Kulwant 
Rai Gupta, there is a sense in India that with regards to 
security matters, the role of the UNSC is increasing 
while that of the UN General Assembly is diminishing. 
Development issues are more and more handled by the IMF 
and the World Bank, while the UN turns into an institution 
dealing mostly with security issues. * is interpretation 
is thus yet another reason why India should seek to gain 
admission as a permanent member to an ever more 
important organ.84 Finally, India is said to eye a permanent 
seat to assure that the United Nations does not get involved 
in the con" ict in Kashmir, which would, Indians fear, lead 
to a partition or independence of Kashmir.85
Speci! cally, India seeks to expand the UNSC by four 
permanent and six non-permanent members. * e G4’s 
proposal envisions the six new permanent seats to be 
occupied by two African nations, two for Asia (India and 
Japan), one for Latin America (Brazil) and the Caribbean 
and one for Western Europe and others (Germany); and 
four new non-permanent members (one from Africa, one 
from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and one from Latin 
America and the Caribbean).86
Similar to Brazil, UN Security Council reform has 
been one of India’s key objectives over the past 
decade, infl uencing its policies to some degree. 
Permanent membership would help India defend its 
ever more global interests.
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While a majority of states, within the General 
Assembly, want to abolish or curtail the right of the veto87, 
India is more pragmatic and seeks no veto rights for new 
permanent members. It thus proves much more realistic, 
given the fact that the current permanent members with 
veto power are unlikely to grant it to any newcomers.88
Similar to Brazil, UN Security Council Reform has been 
one of India’s key objectives over the past decade, in" uencing 
its policies to some degree. Given its prominence, UN 
Security Council Reform has traditionally been regarded 
as a crucial part of any wider UN reform by the Indian 
government. 89 Several of India’s strategies can be better 
understood in the context of the UN Security Council. 
India’s UNSC reform strategy has two main 
components: Garnering support in the UN General 
Assembly and reducing resistance in the UN Security 
Council. * rough India’s continued leadership in the 
G77, India hopes to assure widespread support in the 
UN General Assembly. India’s strong stance on defending 
sovereignty and criticizing “the responsibility to protect” 
can be understood in this context. At the same time, India’s 
recent rapprochement with China, its historic deal with the 
United States, and its continued historic friendship with 
Russia are all meant to assure that none of the permanent 
members would block India’s entry.
India’s decision to openly vie for a seat as part of the “G4” 
was the most recent attempt, which garnered considerable 
support but failed to materialize due to African disunity. 
Speci! cally, the G4’s proposal envisions six new permanent 
seats (two for Africa, two for Asia, one for Latin America 
and the Caribbean and one for Western Europe and 
Others); and four new non-permanent members (one 
from Africa, one from Asia, one from Eastern Europe, and 
one from Latin America and the Caribbean).90 Even South 
Africa supported the proposal.91
Since the G4’s failure in 2005, India has continued to 
focus on UNSC expansion. When the so-called “Small 5” 
or “S5”, a group made up of Switzerland, Singapore, Jordan, 
Costa Rica and Liechtenstein, submitted a proposal that 
sought not to expand the UNSC but change its procedures 
to some degree, India rejected it as it would shi+  focus 
away from expansion.92 India has, together with Brazil and 
South Africa, created an IBSA faction within the Working 
Group set up by the General Assembly (called “Open-
ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable 
Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 
Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security 
Council”), but its impact has not been substantial.93
India seeks to alter some of the UNSC’s rules and 
decision-making procedures, but adheres to its principles, 
ultimately strengthening the UNSC. Its strategy is 
therefore not merely “revisionist”, as is o+ en claimed,94 
but it constitutes revisionist integration. * e fact that 
India is one of the few member states that has been 
elected six times to the body underlines the importance 
of the entity for the Indian government.95 * e 
Indian government bemoans that governance 
structures, particularly in the UNSC, had 
not been able to keep up with contemporary 
realities. Indian politicians believe that India 
should have been granted a permanent seat on 
the UNSC in 1945.96 A+ er failing to obtain a 
seat in 2005, when India was part of the G-4 
(together with Germany, Japan and Brazil), 
the Indian government is determined to 
continuously push for expanding the Council, 
even though short-term success is unlikely. China is seen 
as a crucial gate keeper in India’s attempt to advance in 
the UN Security Council, and this—together with an 
appreciation of China’s growing economic importance—
is one of the reasons that India aims to improve relations 
with China, despite an ongoing border dispute in Arunchal 
Pradesh. In the future, India is more likely to team up with 
Brazil in its attempt to obtain a seat, as Germany and Japan 
weaken India’s claim that developing countries need to be 
better represented.
 4. Conclusion: Leading the disenfranchised or joining 
the establishment?
Brazil’s and India’s bid for institutionalized big-power 
status is contrasted by their traditional membership of and 
loyalty to the G77, where leadership becomes ever more 
di)  cult for increasingly pragmatic governments in Brasília 
and New Delhi.97 As part of the G77 and as an observer of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, Brazil has historically sought 
to promote a more prominent role for the UN General 
Assembly (GA) by envisioning greater GA involvement on 
questions regarding military intervention, for example.98 
Critics have pointed out that Brazil’s attempt to enter the 
UN Security Council as a permanent member is not entirely 
about democratizing the UN, but rather about creating 
an “expanded oligarchy”, as a former Brazilian diplomat 
has called it. While Security Council Reform is also one 
India’s major argument is that its inclusion would 
increase the UNSC’s legitimacy by making it more 
representative of UN membership. In 2004, India 
argued that it deserved the seat because it had the 
world’s second largest population and was the third 
largest contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping 
missions.
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of the Non-Aligned Movements goals,99 Brazil does not 
have all the developing countries’ support in this project, 
and it has been at times criticized for seeking permanent 
UN Security Council membership, which would make it 
part of the “global elite.”100 While India has a rich history 
of confronting established countries, Mohan argues that 
India “woke up” and now rejects “third worldish” modes 
of thinking.101
Brazil’s and India’s behaviour towards the UN General 
Assembly contrasts their e# orts towards UNSC reform, 
and an instructive example about their strong 
ambivalence about their own place. It has also 
o+ en voted in a bloc with other G77 members, 
o+ en against the United States, France and 
Great Britain. For example, it has supported a 
condemnation of the United States’ economic 
embargo against Cuba. Furthermore, it abstained 
from the UN Security Council resolutions with 
on arms embargos to Yugoslavia once ethnic 
cleansing had begun, on intervention in Haiti 
a+ er the coup, and on peacekeeping operations in Rwanda 
and Somalia.102 In this respect Brazil continues to side 
with development countries, and it remains a country 
with a strongly Westphalian outlook. While it regards 
interference approved by the UN Security Council as 
legitimate, it traditionally has been reluctant to vote for 
any type of measures that violate a country’s sovereignty. 
* e Brazilian government is therefore highly critical of 
the concept of “R2P” (Responsibility to Protect), which it 
believes can be easily misused as a pretext for aggressive 
military intervention. 
Despite Brazil’s leadership role in the G77 and its ability 
to in" uence other members,103 Brazil has quietly departed 
from the G77’s more radical calls for “total democracy” 
which includes proposals to limit the UNSC’s freedom 
through the General Assembly—this position very much 
re" ects Brazil’s expectation to form part of the Council at 
some point in the future.104 Despite continuous rhetorical 
support for reform, Brazil has not assumed leadership in 
reviving ECOSOC105, indicating that it does not regard 
this as a priority. 
India’s strategy is comparable. For years, India’s 
representatives have called for a revitalization of the UN 
General Assembly, seeking to strengthen the system. 
In April 2010, for example, Hardeep Puri, Permanent 
Representative of India to the U.N., said that “the General 
Assembly should take the lead in setting the global 
agenda and restoring the centrality of the United Nations 
in formulating multilateral approaches to resolving 
transnational issues.”106 In a similar fashion, Indian 
representatives usually argue that the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), which, despite its pre-eminence in 
the charter, has proved too weak to provide coherence 
to the work of the specialized agencies,107 should be at 
the heart of international e# orts of development. * ere 
is a fundamental agreement with the UNGA’s principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures. India’s 
foreign policy is still in" uenced by its ties to the Non-
Aligned Movement and the G77.108 However, similar 
to Brazil, India’s alignment with the dispossessed is 
increasingly at odds with its e# orts to join the “club of the 
powerful”. 
Aside from a stronger role for the United Nations 
General Assembly, India has traditionally argued for UN 
Security Council Reform – in accordance with the 1992 
Accra Declaration of the Non-Aligned Movement.109 
India’s position has thus been traditionally part of the 
Non-Alignment Movement, although the NAM never 
reached the cohesion of a power bloc. Furthermore, India 
has diverged increasingly to the pragmatist side. India, 
a co-founder of the NAM in 1955, has always pledged 
adherence to the movement, and Indian political leaders 
continue to mention it frequently.110 However, there has 
been growing internal criticism of India’s NAM stance,111 
and India’s foreign policy over the past decade indicates 
that it at times diverges from its traditional, multilateralist 
strategy- for example when it signed a bilateral nuclear 
deal with the United States.112 A former Indian diplomat 
argued that India exerts considerable in" uence over both 
the G77 and NAM, a leadership position India will attempt 
to hold on to as long as possible. He admits, however, 
that India’s economic development may make India’s 
adherence to both clubs increasingly untenable.113 In a 
similar fashion, Nayar and Paul argue that “emotionally 
though not formally, India has (..) already le+  (…) the 
Non-Aligned Movement.”114 Raja Mohan adds that “by the 
late 1990s, [India] was compelled to look for ways to ease 
out of the political straightjacket the NAM had become on 
its external relations.”115 
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